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VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Increased Risks of Forfeiture and
Malpractice Resulting from the Use of Real Estate Contracts: Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION
A real estate contract is a device for financing the unpaid portion of
the purchase price of real estate.' Real estate contracts are commonly
used as substitutes for mortgage financing because they allow buyers to
purchase property with small down payments.' Under the contract, the
purchaser makes periodic installment payments of principal and interest
until the principal balance is fully paid.3 The vendor retains legal title to
the property until the final payment is made, at which time full title is
conveyed to the purchaser.4 When the original purchaser wishes to convey
the property to a third person before the principal balance is fully paid,
a second real estate contract is frequently used, creating a multiple contract
or "pyramid purchase" situation. 5
In Albuquerque National Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc.,6
the New Mexico Supreme Court held that, because a purchaser's assignee
failed to make an installment payment, both the original purchaser of
real estate and the purchaser's assignee had forfeited all rights under a
real estate contract. 7 The court's decision revested the property in the
vendor.' The Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision is based in large part
on the court's rejection of defenses of lack of proper notice of default
and unjust enrichment. 9
The court's refusal to enforce a contractual notice provision results in
1. G. E. Osborne, G. S. Nelson, & D. A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 3.25, at 79
(1979).
2. Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 342, 355 P.2d 277, 279 (1960). See infra note 121.
3. G. E. Osborne, supra note 1, § 3.25, at 79.
4. td.
5. "Pyramid purchase" situations, also referred to as "contract-on-contract" situations, involve
conveyance of the right to take title to the property by the purchaser to a third party. The conveyance
is accomplished either through assignment of the original contract or through a second real estate
contract between the original purchaser and the third party. In the case of an assignment, the third
party acquires the right to receive the original vendor's deed. With a second contract, the third party
is only entitled to the deed of the original purchaser. See generally M. Friedman, Contracts and
Conveyances of Real Property §§ 2.1, 2.4 (4th ed. 1984). Albuquerque Ranch Estates involved both
the assignment of the original contract and a second contract between the purchaser and the assignee.
99 N.M. 95, 98, 655 P.2d 548, 551 (1982). See infra notes 16, 17.
6. 99 N.M. 95, 654 P.2d 548 (1982).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551.
9. Id.
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a new position on the rights and obligations of parties to real estate
contracts. This new position directly contradicts prior New Mexico case
law.' o The court's treatment of the unjust enrichment defense reflects a
trend toward strict enforcement of contractual forfeiture provisions and
away from consideration of fairness and equity. This Note will examine
the impact of the court's resolution of the notice and unjust enrichment
issues on: (1) the use of real estate contracts in New Mexico, particularly
in multiple contract situations;" and (2) the ability of attorneys to avoid
malpractice and to protect adequately the interests of their real estate
clients. 12

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1974, Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc. ("Ranch Estates") sold
approximately 7.5 acres of unimproved land to Tract C, a partnership,
pursuant to a written real estate contract.' 3 The contract was placed in
escrow with Albuquerque National Bank.'" The contract stipulated that
time was of the essence and provided for forfeiture if default under the
contract continued for ninety days after mailing of a written demand for
payment. "
In 1979, Tract C sold the property to KAC, Inc. ("KAC") pursuant
to a second real estate contract.' 6 Tract C also assigned its rights under
10. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court's
decision to permit forfeiture without enforcing the original purchaser's contractual right to notice of
default has already resulted in one suit against an attorney for professional negligence. See Tract C,
A New Mexico General Partnership v. John Doe, No. CV 83-05672 (N.M. Dist. Ct., Second Jud.
Dist. 1983).
13. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. The contract, dated April 15, 1974, was a Valiant #103
form of real estate contract which provided for yearly payment of interest through April 15, 1979.
Transcript of Record on Appeal at 22 [hereinafter cited as Record]. (The Record is available at the
University of New Mexico Law School Library.) The principal amount was payable in annual
installments from 1980 through 1983, with the remaining balance due on April 15, 1984. Id.
14. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551.
15. Id. The forfeiture provision, clause 8 of the contract, stated:
Should the Purchaser fail to make any of the payments at the respective times
herein specified . . . and continue in default for ninety (90) days after written
demand for such payments . . . then the Owner may, at his option, either declare
the whole amount remaining unpaid to be then due . . . or he may terminate this
contract and retain all sums theretofore paid hereunder as rental to that date for
the use of said premises. . ..

Record at 22.
16. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. The real estate contract between Tract C and KAC provided
that KAC would assume the balance of payments due under the Ranch Estates/Tract C contract and
would pay additional amounts to Tract C. Record at 11. The final payment under the KAC/Tract C
contract was also due April 15, 1984. Id. The contract also contained a forfeiture clause which
required KAC to cure any default within 30 days of written demand for payment by Tract C. Id.
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7
the original real estate contract with Ranch Estates to KAC. Ranch
8
Estates consented to the assignment.'
The first payment of principal under the contract with Ranch Estates
became due in April 1980.19 During that month, an agent for KAC contacted Ranch Estates, verbally requested an extension of time within
2
which to make the payment, and offered to pay for the extension. " Ranch
Estates indicated that it would consider only a written request for an
extension."
On May 14, 1980, KAC sent to Ranch Estates a written request offering
to pay 15% interest on the $32,672.42 installment payment due in April
in return for Ranch Estates' consent to defer payment of the installment
until July 31, 1980.22 Ranch Estates responded with a letter indicating
that it understood KAC to have offered to pay $4,900 (15% of the installment payment) and that it would agree to the extension only upon
immediate payment of that sum. 23 Ranch Estates' letter also demanded
payment of the installment and stated that the letter was not to be considered an extension of time within which to make the contract payments. 24
By letter dated May 27, 1980, KAC advised Ranch Estates that it had
not intended to offer $4,900 and tendered a check in the amount of
$3,132.25 The letter also indicated that the check was tendered subject to

17. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. The assignment stated that Tract C assigned to KAC "all
rights, title, interest and equity in and to that certain Real Estate contract dated April 15, 1974."
Record at 6. The assignment was also placed in escrow with Albuquerque National Bank. Record
at 26.
18. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. The consent stated:
I, We the undersigned, Owners of the property described in the foregoing
contract, hereby consent to the foregoing Assignment and agree to mail a copy
of any notice of default and/or demand for payments . . . which I/We may cause
to be sent to the Purchaser under the terms of said Real Estate Contract, to the
said Assignee. ...
Record at 8. Based on the language of Ranch Estates' consent, the intent of the parties was that
Tract C, the purchaser, would receive the original notice of default and KAC, the assignee, would
receive a copy of the notice.
19. 99 N.M. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Ranch Estates' May 19 letter stated, in part:
This letter is not to be considered as an extension of time within which the
contract payments are required to be made. Further, this letter is to be considered
as written demand for such payment and failure to pay the same within the time
required by the contract will result in either a declaration that the whole amount
remaining shall be due or a termination of this contract. . ..
Id.
25. Id. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552. The misunderstanding arose from confusion between "15% interest
on the payment" and "15% of the payment." KAC originally offered to pay 15% interest on the
$32,672.42 installment, $32.672.42,, 15%/365 &y, x 107 days (from April 15 to July 31) or $1,437.01.
Record at 63-75. Ranch Estates responded that it understood KAC to have offered 15% of the
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the conditions that: (1) collection of the check constituted Ranch Estates'
agreement to an extension of the time within which to make the payment;
(2) KAC was relieved of any default by reason of its failure to make the
April installment payment; and (3) Ranch Estates' notice of default was
withdrawn. 26 Following receipt of KAC's May 27 tender letter, Ranch
Estates made no attempt to deposit the check for collection.27 Moreover,
Ranch Estates neither expressly approved an extension nor withdrew its
notice of default. 28
In June, Ranch Estates verbally advised Tract C that a notice of default
had been sent to KAC. 29 Tract C then sent KAC a demand letter advising
KAC that if all payments under the contract with Ranch Estates were not
made current within thirty days, Tract C would exercise its rights under
the forfeiture provision of its contract with KAC.30 KAC did not reply
to Tract C's demand letter.3
On August 19, 1980, KAC still had not paid the April installment.3 2
Ranch Estates notified Albuquerque National Bank that it was electing
to exercise its right of forfeiture under the contract.33 Upon learning of
Ranch Estates' termination of the contract, KAC tendered a check to the
bank in payment of the past-due installment.34 When Ranch Estates refused to accept the payment, the bank instituted an interpleader action,
requesting the court to adjudicate the rights of each party under the
contract. 3
The trial court ruled that both KAC and Tract C had forfeited their
rights under the real estate contract and held that the property had revested
$32,672.42 installment ($32,672.24 x 15% = $4900). Id. KAC's May 27 letter advised Ranch
Estates that Ranch Estates had misunderstood the offer and that KAC was willing to "split the
difference" between the two amounts. Id. Accordingly, KAC tendered its check in the amount of
$3,132. Id.
26. 99 N.M. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552.
27. Id. at 99-100, 654 P.2d at 552-53. It is important to note that, although Ranch Estates made
no attempt to cash the check, Ranch Estates continued to retain the check without notifying KAC
that it was not granting the requested extension of time. Id. at 100, 654 P.2d at 553.
28. Id. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552.
29. Id. The court found that Tract C, based on a conversation with KAC, contacted Ranch Estates
to inquire if Ranch Estates had sent KAC notice of default. In response to Tract C's inquiry, Ranch
Estates verbally acknowledged having sent notice of default to KAC, but refused to provide Tract
C with information concerning the date on which notice had been sent or the amount of default.
Record at 358-59.
30. 99 N.M. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552. See supra note 15.
31. 99 N.M. at 99, 654 P.2d at 552.
32. Id.at 100, 654 P.2d at 553.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The bank, as escrow agent, brought the interpleader action pursuant to N.M. R. Civ. P.
22, which permits a plaintiff that may be exposed to multiple liability to join, as defendants, all
parties having claims to the property held by the plaintiff.
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in Ranch Estates.36 KAC and Tract C appealed.37 Numerous issues were
raised on appeal, including the court's determination of the defenses of
lack of proper notice and unjust enrichment. 3" The New Mexico Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.39 The Supreme Court held
that Ranch Estates had provided adequate notice of default' and that the
trial court did not err in failing to adopt the notice and unjust enrichment
defenses. 4
III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision is an example of the recent
tendency in the New Mexico courts to enforce contractual forfeiture
provisions strictly. In marked contrast to strict enforcement of a forfeiture
provision, however, the Albuquerque Ranch Estates court refused to enforce a provision requiring the vendor to provide written notice of default
to the original purchaser following assignment of the contract.
The uncertainty resulting from the court's resolution of the notice issue,
coupled with the trend toward strict judicial enforcement of forfeiture
provisions, significantly increases the risk associated with the use of
multiple real estate contracts.42 First, as a result of the decision, a vendor
may now act to forfeit an original purchaser's rights without providing
the original purchaser with either notice of default by the assignee *oran
36. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551.
37. Id. The appeal was taken directly from the trial court to the New Mexico Supreme Court.
The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction in all cases unless jurisdiction is specifically granted
to the court of appeals by law. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-5-14 (Repl. Pamp.
1981). Jurisdiction over appeals of cases involving property rights is not specifically granted to the
court of appeals. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 29; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-5-8 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
38. 99 N.M. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. In addition to the notice and unjust enrichment issues, KAC
and Tract C challenged the trial court's rulings on the defenses of accord and satisfaction, estoppel,
waiver, laches, and mistake of fact. Id. at 100-02, 654 P.2d at 553-55. KAC also argued that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant KAC's motion for continuance. Id. at 104, 654 P.2d at 557. A
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Note.
39. Id. at 98, 654 P.2d at 551. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on each of the challenged
points.
The supreme court's decision in Albuquerque Ranch Estates, however, did not finally resolve the
dispute between the parties. Instead, the decision has resulted in ongoing litigation among Ranch
Estates, KAC, Tract C and their officers, agents, and attorneys. See, e.g., Albuquerque National
Bank v. Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Inc., N.M. -. , 687 P.2d 91 (1984), and Tract C, A New
Mexico General Partnership v. John Doe, No. CV 83-05672 (N.M. Dist. Ct., Second Jud. Dist.
1983).
40. 99 N.M. at 103, 105, 654 P.2d at 556, 558.
41. Id. at 102, 106, 654 P.2d at 555, 559.
42. The risk to purchasers using real estate contracts is the risk of extra-judicial forfeiture without
a right of redemption. Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 92, 678 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1984). By
eliminating a traditional means for protecting the original purchaser's rights, the Albuquerque Ranch
Estates court has significantly increased this risk. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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opportunity to cure any such default. Second, in light of prior New Mexico
law,43 it is no longer clear whether a vendor has an obligation to provide
any notice of default in multiple contract situations." Finally, the apparent
intent of the courts to uphold forfeiture provisions with little consideration
for the equities of the parties renders forfeiture an almost certain result
of any default. This increased risk of forfeiture will ultimately serve to
limit the use of multiple contracts as devices for financing real estate
transactions in New Mexico.
The inconsistency between the strict enforcement of forfeiture clauses
and the failure to enforce notice provisions also increases the risk to
attorneys of committing malpractice when structuring real estate transactions. The written notice provision has been the primary means of
protecting purchasers from unwarranted forfeiture. Any client whose rights
are forfeited without notice is likely to seek recourse against the attorney
who rendered advice on, or who drafted the contract. 5
A. Notice of Default
Tract C contended that the forfeiture provision should not be enforced
because Ranch Estates had failed to provide Tract C with adequate notice
of default.' The court rejected Tract C's argument, concluding that: (1)
by assignment of its contract with Ranch Estates to KAC, Tract C was
relieved of any further obligation under the contract; 47 (2) following the
assignment, Tract C retained no further interest in the property;48 and (3)
because Tract C had no interest that could be affected by forfeiture, Tract
C was not entitled to any notice of default.49 In reaching these conclusions,
the court adopted a new position that contradicts not only the law in the
majority of jurisdictions,5" but also prior New Mexico case law."
1. Assignment Relieves the Assignor of Further Obligation
In rejecting Tract C's notice argument, the court relied on a 1918
California decision, Drips v. Moore. 2 Drips held that an assignment of
43. See Campbell v. Kerr, 95 N.M. 73, 618 P.2d 1237(1980); infra notes 76-79 and accompanying
text.
44. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 12.
46. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
47. Id. at 104, 654 P.2d at 557.
48. Id. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
49. Id.
50. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
52. 179 Cal. 249, 176 P. 159 (1918). The factual situation presented in Drips was similar in
many respects to the Albuquerque Ranch Estates fact pattern. The defendant purchaser assigned all
right, title, and interest in the real estate contract between the purchaser and the plaintiff vendor.
, 176 P. at 159. The assignee failed to make a payment of interest due under the contract.
Id. at
176 P. at 159. The court determined that the purchaser was not entitled to notice of
Id. at -,
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all right, title, and interest in a real estate contract relieves the original
purchaser of any further obligation under the contract." By following the
Drips decision, the Albuquerque Ranch Estates court adopted a position
on the effect of assignment of contracts which is contrary to that of the
majority of jurisdictions.
Under the majority rule, the assignment of all right, title, and interest
in a real estate contract passes only an equitable interest in the property
to the assignee.54 The assignment, by itself, does not release the original
purchaser (the assignor) from its obligations under the contract. 55 Instead,
it conveys the original purchaser's right to receive the vendor's title and
delegates the original purchaser's duty to pay the purchase price. 56 The
delegation of the duty to pay, however, does not relieve the original
purchaser of its contractual liability to the original vendor. 57 Under the
majority rule, the original purchaser may still be liable on the contract
in the event of default by the assignee.58
Courts generally hold that in order for a purchaser to be relieved of
any further obligation under a contract, the vendor must clearly and
expressly release the original purchaser and substitute the assignee as
debtor.59 The original purchaser and its assignee cannot affect, by the act
forfeiture because the purchaser no longer had any interest to which the act of forfeiture could apply.
Id. at -,
176 P. at 160. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates situation is distinguishable, however,
based on the existence of the second real estate contract between Tract C and KAC. See infra notes
69-71 and accompanying text.
53. 179 Cal. at -_, 176 P. at 160.
54. See generally M. Friedman, supra note 5, at §§ 2.1, 2.4. The assignee is only entitled to
receive the vendor's deed after completion of performance of the contract. Id. § 2.1.
55. See, e.g., Foster v. Cross, 650 P.2d 406, 410 (Alaska 1982); Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d
735, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Smith v. Werhe, 199 Neb. 753, 261 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1978);
Greenbrier Homes v. Cook, I Mich. App. 326, 136 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1965); Centisco, Inc. v. Sales
Realty Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 331, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 457, 461 (Ct. Civ. App. 1966); Carluccio v. 607
Hudson Street Holding Co., 139 N.J. Eq. 481, 52 A.2d 56, 59 (1947); Barnard v. Huff, 252 Minn.
258, 233 N.W. 213, 214-15 (1930). See generally 3 S. Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§411 (3d ed. 1960); M. Friedman, supra note 5, §2.1, at 120.
56. M. Friedman, supra note 5, §2.1, at 120; 4 A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §867, at
463 (1951).
57. 4 A. L. Corbin, supra note 56, at 463.
In Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d 735 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), which involved a fact situation similar
to Albuquerque Ranch Estates, the court ruled that the assignment of a real estate contract does not
work to relieve the purchaser of all further obligation under the contract. Id. at 743. The Boswell
decision is in accord with the majority of jurisdictions. See cases cited supra note 55.
58. 4 A. L. Corbin, supra note 56, at 463.
59. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §318(3) (1981). This process is known as novation.
Novation is the express extinguishment of the original contract, the substitution of another party as
debtor, and the creation of a new contract. 6 A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1297, at 213-23
(1962).
Assignment, on the other hand, is the transfer of the contractual rights by the owner to another
party. The original contract, however, remains in full force and effect, and under the majority rule,
there is no substitution of the other party as debtor. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 (1981).
Friedman suggests that novation is a preferable alternative to assignment where the parties wish to
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of assignment, the original purchaser's obligations to the vendor.' The
vendor's consent to the assignment does not constitute an agreement to
discharge the original purchaser's obligation. 6 ' Instead, all parties must
expressly agree that: (1) the original contract is extinguished; (2) the
original purchaser is released from all further obligation; and (3) a new
contract exists between the vendor and the assignee.62
Under the majority rule, Tract C's assignment of the original contract
in Albuquerque Ranch Estates would not constitute a release of Tract C.
Ranch Estates was not a party to the assignment.63 Moreover, nothing in
the language of Ranch Estates' consent to the assignment purported to
release Tract C from its obligations. 4 Under the majority rule, therefore,
Tract C's obligations under the contract with Ranch Estates were not
extinguished by the assignment to KAC. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates
court, however, adopted the minority view, as enumerated in Drips v.
avoid questions concerning the continued liability of the original purchaser. M. Friedman, supra
note 5, at 163.
Finally, an assumption arises when a party to the contract delegates the duty to perform contractual
obligations to another party and the other party undertakes to perform those obligations. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 318 (1981). An assumption of contractual obligations often occurs in conjunction with an assignment of rights, as it did in Albuquerque Ranch Estates, 99 N.M. at 98, 654
P. 2d at 55 1. Even with an assumption, however, the assignor remains liable on the contract, occupying
in essence the position of a surety. 3 S. Williston, supra note 55, at § 418, at 96-98.
60. 4 A. L. Corbin, supra note 56, § 866, at 458.
61. See, e.g., Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). In Boswell, the
vendor consented to the assignment of the original real estate contract. The court held that the
vendor's consent to the assignment did not release the purchaser from contractual liability. Id. at
742. See also Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Fruehauf, 518 F.2d 966, 969 (5th Cir. 1975) (although
consent to assignment was not sufficient to constitute a release of a construction contract, a material
issue of fact existed as to whether parties intended novation); Smith v. Wrehe, 199 Neb. 753, 261
N.W.2d 620, 625-26 (1978) (vendor's consent to purchaser's assignment of a contract for sale of
taxi cab company did not release the purchaser); Moring v. Miller, 330 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. Ct. App.
1976) (inventor's knowledge of assignment of contract for payment of patent royalties by patent
owner to a third party did not release the patent owner from the obligation to pay royalties).
62. New Mexico law recognizes novation as a means for releasing a party from its contractual
obligations. Under New Mexico law, in order for a novation to exist: (1) there must be a valid,
existing contract; (2) all parties must agree to a new contract; (3) the original contract must be
extinguished by the new contract; and (4) the new contract must be valid. See, e.g., Sims v. Craig,
96 N.M. 33, 35, 627 P.2d 875, 877 (1981) (court held that novation had not occurred when parties
entered into a second real estate contract because the original contract had been void and unenforceable).
63. Record at 6.
64. Record at 8. See supra note 18 for the language of the consent. Ranch Estates claimed that
it had no knowledge of the second real estate contract between Tract C and KAC and that its
understanding was that Tract C had given up any interest in the property by the assignment. Record
at 31. It generally has been held, however, that a vendor's knowledge of a second real estate contract
is unnecessary because the second contract does not affect the rights and obligations between the
vendor and purchaser under the original contract. See M. Friedman, supra note 5, § 2.1, at 158
n.14.
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Moore,65 that an assignment releases the assignor from further obligation. '
2. The Assignor Retains No Interest Following Assignment
In addition to its determination that assignment relieved Tract C of any
further obligation under the original contract, the Albuquerque Ranch
Estates court concluded that Tract C retained no further interest in the
property following the assignment.67 The Albuquerque Ranch Estates
decision ignores any interest of the original purchaser under a second
contract with the assignee.
The Drips decision, followed by the Albuquerque Ranch Estates court,
found that a purchaser had assigned all of his rights under the contract
and, therefore, retained no interest in the property to which the act of
forfeiture would apply.68 Unlike the Albuquerque Ranch Estates court,
however, the Drips court was not faced with the existence of a second
contract between the purchaser and the assignee.6 9 In its contract with
KAC, Tract C explicitly retained both the right of forfeiture against the
property and the right to hold KAC responsible for payments under the
second contract.7" Unlike the Drips defendant, Tract C clearly retained
65. 179 Cal. at.-, 176 P. at 160.
66. 99 N.M. at 104-05, 654 P.2d at 557-58. It should be noted that although Drips, on which
the New Mexico court relied, has never been overruled, it had never previously been cited for the
proposition that assignment relieves the assignor of any further obligation under the contract.
The author has been unable to find any authority from any other jurisdiction which adopts the
position that assignment of the contract relieves the assignor of all obligation. Even California,
subsequent to Drips, has adopted the majority view. See Nelson v. Fernando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal.
2d 511, 55 P.2d 859 (1936). The Nelson court stated, "The effect of the assignment was to transfer
all of [the assignor's] rights under the contract to plaintiff .. although the burdens of the contract
remained with [the assignor]." Id. at - , 55 P.2d at 862.
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates ruling on the effect of the assignment is also inconsistent with a
prior holding in Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Hitson, 73 N.M. 328, 388 P.2d 56 (1953). In
Hitson, which dealt with a mortgage rather than a real estate contract, the court held that the
assumption of a mortgage by a third party did not release the original maker from its obligations
on the underlying promissory note. 73 N.M. at 331, 388 P.2d at 57-58.
67. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
68. 179 Cal. at __,

176 P. at 160.

69. The facts in Drips show that the vendor and the original purchaser entered into a contract
for the sale of property. Id. at -, 176 P. at 159. The original purchaser then assigned the contract
to the assignee. Id. The assignee took possession of the property and assumed the original purchaser's
obligation to make the contractual payments. Id. Nothing in the Drips opinion, however, indicates
that a second contract existed between the original purchaser and the assignee such as existed between
Tract C and KAC.
70. Record at 47. Paragraph 8 of the contract between Tract C and KAC was similar to the
provision in the original contract between Tract C and Ranch Estates. The second real estate contract,
however, provided for a right of forfeiture 30 days after written demand for payment, rather than
the 90-day cure period provided for in the original contract. See supra note 16.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

an interest which an act of forfeiture by Ranch Estates would affect. 7 In

light of the second real estate contract between Tract C and KAC, the
reliance on Drips by the Albuquerque Ranch Estates court appears to be
misplaced.7 2
The court's decision to enforce forfeiture without regard to the second
real estate contract effectively nullifies the second contract. It is impossible for the original purchaser to perform its obligations under the second
contract after the property has revested in the vendor.73 The assignee's
purpose, to purchase the property, is frustrated by the impossibility of
the original purchaser's performance." The Albuquerque Ranch Estates
court's decision to enforce Ranch Estates' right of forfeiture under the
original contract, therefore, left Tract C and KAC as parties to a meaningless second contract."
71. An act of forfeiture by Ranch Estates against KAC would revest possession of the property
in Ranch Estates, thereby preventing Tract C from exercising its right of forfeiture.
72. The trial court's finding that, by assigning the contract, Tract C retained no further interest
in the property also appears to be clearly erroneous in light of the fact that the assignment was placed
in escrow. See supra note 17. When a document is delivered in escrow, it is delivered to a third
party to be held until the obligee has performed some condition. IA A. L. Corbin, supra note 59,
§247, at 413-14. The document delivered in escrow does not become operative until the condition
has been performed. Id. § 249, at 424. In addition, until the condition is performed, the grantor
retains its property interest. Id. § 249, at 418.
In Albuquerque Ranch Estates, the condition was KAC's full performance of its obligations to
Tract C under the second cotract, including payment of the installments under the original contract
with Ranch Estates and the additional amounts due Tract C. See supra note 16. By placing the
assignment in escrow, Tract C's assignment of its interest in the contract with Ranch Estates would
not have become operative until KAC made the final contract payments on April 15, 1984. See
supra notes 16, 17. Tract C, therefore, still retained an interest when Ranch Estates acted to forfeit
the property on August 19, 1980. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
Although the trial court received the original assignment as one of the escrowed documents from
Albuquerque National Bank, Record at 26, there is nothing in the Record which indicates that the
trial court addressed the effect of delivery in escrow in reaching its decision. Unfortunately, none
of the parties raised this issue in the appeal to the supreme court.
73. Performance under a contract becomes impossible when the subject matter of the contract is
eliminated. A. L. Corbin, supra note 59, § 1321, at 324. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision
eliminates the subject matter of the second contract, the property, by permitting the property to
revest in the vendor (who is not a party to the second contract). The original purchaser's right to
receive title to the property from the vendor is extinguished following forfeiture of the property
under the original contract. See M. Friedman, supra note 5, §§ 2.1, 2.4. As a result, even if the
assignee made all payments under the second contract, the original purchaser would never be able
to fulfill its obligation to the assignee to convey title to the property. Id. Ordinarily, however, the
impossibility of performance by the original purchaser would discharge the assignee's obligation to
make the contract payments. A. L. Corbin, supra, note 59, § 1321, at 325.
74. The assignee will never receive title to the property. See supra note 73. Performance by the
assignee under the second contract is still possible because the assignee can continue to fulfill its
obligation to make payments. However, because the original purchaser cannot convey title, the
assignee's purpose in entering into the second contract is frustrated. A. L. Corbin, supra note 59,
§ 1322, at 325-26.
75. This result seems unfair to the original purchaser, but not to the assignee. Because forfeiture
of the property is the result of default by the assignee, see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying
text, there does not seem to be anything inequitable about eliminating the assignee's right to receive
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3. The Assignor Is Not Entitled to Notice of Default
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates holding that a vendor has no obligation
to provide notice of the assignee's default to the original purchaser directly76
contradicts prior New Mexico law as articulated in Campbell v. Kerr.
Campbell also involved multiple real estate contracts where the assignee
assumed performance under the original purchaser's contract with the
vendor. 7 The Campbell court determined that the original purchaser was
entitled to notice of demand for payment in the event the assignee defaulted.78 The court held, however, that the vendor was under no obligation to provide notice of default to the assignee who had undertaken
payment of amounts due under the original contract.79
Taken to its logical extreme, the union of the Albuquerque Ranch
Estates court's holding that the vendor is not obligated to provide notice
of default to the original purchaser and the Campbell court's conclusion
that the vendor is not required to provide notice to an assignee leads to
a conclusion that the vendor has no obligation to provide notice of default
to anyone. Such a result is inconsistent with the language in most standard
real estate contracts that the right of forfeiture accrues within a certain
period of time following the vendor's notice of default.8" Such a result
also is inequitable because it permits the vendor to act unilaterally to
forfeit the property without providing the original purchaser with an
opportunity to protect its interest by curing the assignee's default.81
B. Unjust Enrichment
Tract C and KAC contended that forfeiture of their rights under the
contract would result in unjust enrichment to Ranch Estates.82 The claim
of unjust enrichment was based on two separate grounds. First, the defendants claimed that, because of the substantial appreciation in value of
the property, Ranch Estates would be unjustly enriched if the court rentitle under the second contract. The original purchaser, on the other hand, has neither defaulted, nor
been provided with an opportunity to cure the assignee's default. See infra notes 111-15 and
accompanying text. Under these circumstances, it seems inequitable to permit the vendor to eliminate
unilaterally the original purchaser's rights to receive title to the property under the original contract,
to retake the property in the event the assignee defaults under the second contract, and to receive
the contractual payments from the assignee. See supra notes 71, 73 and accompanying text. A more
equitable result could have been achieved in Albuquerque Ranch Estates by affording Tract C an
equitable right to redeem the property. See infra note 108.
76. 95 N.M. 73, 618 P.2d 1237 (1980).
77. Id.at 75, 618 P.2d at 1239.
78. Id.at 79, 618 P.2d at 1243.
79. Id.
80. The language in paragraph 8 of the contract between Tract C and Ranch Estates is typical.
See supra note 15.
81. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
82. 99 N.M. at 102, 105, 654 P.2d at 555, 558.
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dered judgment revesting the property in Ranch Estates. 3 Second, Tract
C and KAC argued that Ranch Estates should not be permitted to regain
possession of the land and to retain all payments made under the contract
because the payments were not a reasonable approximation of the fair
rental value for the property. 4 The trial court found that these arguments
were without merit because, based on8 5the evidence, forfeiture would not
"shock the conscience" of the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's disposition of the unjust enrichment claim.8 6
Albuquerque Ranch Estates is one of several recent decisions in which
the New Mexico courts have been unpersuaded by arguments based on
unjust enrichment.8 7 Although the opinions continue to reiterate the adage
that "equity abhors forfeiture," the New Mexico courts have generally
elected to enforce contractual forfeiture provisions strictly."8 The forfeiture
cases seem to reflect a policy choice which favors requiring parties to
abide by the terms of their contracts at the expense of a fair and equitable
result in real estate cases.8 9
In a line of decisions beginning with Bishop v. Beecher," New Mexico
courts have consistently stated that, absent unfairness which shocks the
conscience of the court, vendors are entitled to enforce contractual forfeiture provisions. 9 The presence of unfairness which shocks the court's
conscience will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 92
83. Id. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
84. Id. at 102, 654 P.2d at 555; Record at 123.
85. Record at 155.
86. 99 N.M. at 106, 654 P.2d at 559.
87. See, e.g., First National Bank in Alamogordo v. Cape, 100 N.M. 525, 673 P.2d 502 (1983).
In Cape, an interpleader action, the court held that forfeiture of the property after payments under
the contract had been in arrears for eight months did not result in unfairness which shocked the
conscience of the court. Id. at 528, 673 P.2d at 505.
88. See Albuquerque Ranch Estates, 99 N.M. at 102, 654 P.2d at 555; Martinez v. Martinez,
101 N.M. 88, 91, 678 P.2d 1163, 1166 (1984); Poorbaugh v. Mullen, 96 N.M 598, 602, 633 P.2d
706, 710 (Ct. App. 1981); Hale v. Whitlock, 92 N.M. 657, 658, 593 P.2d 754, 755 (1979).
89. See generally Note, Contracts-Exculpatory Provisions-A Bank's Liability for Ordinary
Negligence: Lynch v. Santa Fe National Bank, 12 N.M.L. Rev. 821, 831 (1982).
90. 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960). Bishop was an action by the purchasers of real estate
asking the court to declare a real estate contract to be an equitable mortgage and to grant them a
right of redemption. Id. at 341, 355 P.2d at 277-78. The court held that the contract was not an
equitable mortgage, that the vendors had a right to terminate the contract upon default, and that
absent unfairness which shocks the conscience, the purchasers had no right of redemption. Id. at
343, 355 P.2d at 279-80.
91. Id. at 342, 355 P.2d at 280. See also Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 678 P.2d 1163
(1984); Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 561 P.2d 52 (1983); Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565
P.2d 340 (1977); Note, The Future of the Real Estate Contract in New Mexico: Huckins v. Ritter,
14 N.M.L. Rev. 531 (1984).
92. See, e.g., Eiferle v. Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 565 P.2d 340 (1977). In Eiferle, the court
articulated its analysis as follows:
Bearing in mind the specific facts in this case . . . we feel that to permit the
defendant to cancel the agreement, regain title to the property, and retain all
payments made, would result in an "unfairness which shocks the conscience of
the court."
Id. at 470, 565 P.2d at 341 (emphasis added). See also Note, supra note 91, at 538.
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The New Mexico courts have previously considered a number of factors
in determining whether there is sufficient unfairness present in a case so
as to preclude enforcement of the forfeiture provision.93 First, the courts
have examined the nature of the property and have been less inclined to
enforce forfeiture clauses strictly when the property is being used by the
defendant as a residence.' Second, the courts have considered the result
intended by the contracting parties." Third, the New Mexico courts have
examined whether the amounts paid under the contract prior to default
approximate fair rental value for the property.96 KAC and Tract C's arguments centered on two factors which they contended were indicative
of the presence of unfairness sufficient to preclude enforcement of the
forfeiture provision: fair rental value and appreciation in value of the
property.97
1. Fair Rental Value
KAC and Tract C first argued that, because the property was undeveloped property, it had no rental value. 9" The amounts paid under the
93. Courts in various jurisdictions consider a number of factors in determining whether unfairness
sufficient to preclude the enforcement of a forfeiture provision exists in a given transaction. In
Rothenberg v. Follman, 19 Mich. App. 383, 172 N.W.2d 845, 848 (1969), the Michigan court
stated that relevant factors included: (1) the reason for delay in making payments; (2) the amount
and length of default; (3) the amount of the buyer's forfeiture, such as sums paid to the seller and
appreciation in value of the property; and (4) the speed with which equitable relief is sought by the
buyer. Id. The court in Will Rogers Farm Agency v. Stafford, 4 Wash. App. 500, 482 P.2d 336
(1971), weighed the equities between the parties, taking into consideration the financial loss to the
buyer resulting from forfeiture as compared to the seller's loss should forfeiture be relieved and the
current status of the hardship (whether the problem causing the default still remained). 4 Wash.
App. at -,
482 P.2d at 337-38.
94. See, e.g., Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 561-62, 661 P.2d 52, 53-54 (1983); Eiferle v.
Toppino, 90 N.M. 469, 470, 565 P.2d 340, 341 (1977); Ott v. Keller, 90 N.M. 1, 3-4, 558 P.2d
613, 615-16 (1976).
95. See, e.g., Hale v. Whitlock, 92 N.M. 657, 658, 593 P.2d 754, 755 (1979). Hale involved
a declaratory judgment action by the purchaser, Id. at 657, 593 P.2d at 754. The vendor had not
objected to the purchaser's failure to make payments in a timely manner. Id. The vendor subsequently
assigned the contract, and the assignee demanded that past due installments be brought current. Id.
The court held that the purchasers had been led to expect that timely payment would not be insisted
upon and, therefore, granted the purchasers additional time to pay the amounts due under the contract.
Id. at 657-58, 593 P.2d at 754-55.
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates trial court found that, like the Hale purchaser, Tract C and KAC
had been consistently late in making payments to Ranch Estates. Record at 159. Unlike Hale,
however, where the court treated acceptance of late payments as a waiver of the timeliness requirement, the trial court in Albuquerque Ranch Estates used the pattern of late payments to support its
conclusion that immediate forfeiture was appropriate. Id. The supreme court found that this conclusion
was supported by substantial evidence. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
96. See, e.g., Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. 85, 88, 385 P.2d 950, 953 (1963). The Davies purchaser
had made five monthly installment payments of $100 per month prior to the default. Id. at 87-88,
385 P.2d at 952-53. The court held that parties to a contract may provide for forfeiture of installment
payments which approximate rent and which were made prior to default, provided reasonable notice
of default is required by the contract. Id. at 88-89, 385 P.2d at 953-54. The Albuquerque Ranch
Estates court upheld forfeiture of the installment payments made by Tract C despite Ranch Estates'
failure to provide Tract C with notice of default. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
97. 99 N.M. at 102, 105, 654 P.2d at 555, 558.
98. Record at 123. The property was unimproved, commercially zoned, vacant land without
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contract, therefore, could not approximate fair rental value. To permit
Ranch Estates to retake possession of the property would unjustly enrich
Ranch Estates." The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground
that the parties had explicitly agreed to treat payments previously made
as rent in the event of default. O
The court's resolution of the rental value argument follows prior decisions involving similar provisions for forfeiture of payments.' The
New Mexico courts have consistently demonstrated a willingness to uphold forfeiture of installment payments made prior to default where the
contract provides that the payments are to be considered rent for use of
' Previous decisions, however, have invariably required
the property. 02
that the contract provide for reasonable notice of default. Only then have
the courts enforced provisions for forfeiture of the contract payments. 03
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court's holding that the vendor is not
required to give notice of default to an original purchaser is inconsistent
with these previous decisions. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision
implicitly eliminates notice of default as a requirement for enforcement
of provisions mandating that payments are to be forfeited as rent in the
event of default. l04
sewage connection. KAC and Tract C argued that the property, in its unimproved state, had no
significant rental value. Id.
99. At the date of trial, Ranch Estates had received a total of $94,247 under the contract. Id.
100. 99 N.M. at 103, 654 P.2d at 556. The forfeiture clause provided that the vendor "may
terminate this contract and retain all sums theretofore paid hereunder as rental to that date for the
use of said premises." Id.at 99, 654 P.2d at 552.
101. See, e.g., Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d 277 (1960); Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M.
85, 385 P.2d 950 (1963).
The analysis of the enforcement of provisions for forfeiture of installment payments which approximate rent is analogous to the treatment of liquidated damages provisions in contracts under
§ 2-718 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under §2-718, the parties may agree to the amount of
damages for breach by either party, but only at an amount which is reasonable in light of the
anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach. Bishop and Davies indicated that the New Mexico
court was willing to permit the parties to a real estate contract to liquidate damages for default, but
only in an amount which approximates a reasonable rent for use of the property. Compare Bishop,
67 N.M. at 343, 355 P.2d at 279 (court determined that the amounts paid under the contract amounted
to around $60 per month and held that forfeiture of the payments in those circumstances would not
result in any inequity), with Huckins v. Ritter, 99 N.M. 560, 562, 661 P.2d 52, 54 (1983) (court
found that, because the purchaser had been in possession of the property for less than one year and
had made total payments of $45,000, allowing the vendor to retain all payments made would constitute
an unwarranted forfeiture).
In a departure from previous decisions, neither the trial court nor the supreme court in Albuquerque
Ranch Estates appear to have made any determination that the amounts paid prior to default did, in
fact, approximate a fair and reasonable rent for use of the property. See 99 N.M. at 103, 654 P.2d
at 556.
102. See supra note 101.
103. See Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950, 951 (1963); Hale v. Whitlock, 92 N.M.
657, 593 P.2d 754 (1979).
104. See 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court did reiterate
the requirement of reasonable notice prior to forfeiture of installment payments in its opinion. Id.
at 103, 654 P.2d at 556. The court's decision to permit forfeiture of the payments made by Tract C
prior to default is inconsistent, however, with its decision not to enforce the clear language of the
original real estate contract and the language of the consent to the assignment, both of which stated
that Ranch Estates would provide notice of default to Tract C. See supra notes 15, 18.
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2. Appreciation in Value
The second factor pointed to by Tract C and KAC as evidence of unjust
enrichment related to the appreciation in value of the property. KAC and
Tract C presented evidence at trial that the property's current value was
four times greater at the time of trial than it had been when Ranch Estates
and Tract C entered into the original real estate contract."°5 The supreme
court stated that appreciation in the value of the property was not sufficient
grounds for the court to alter the terms of the contract. 106 The court then
held that, considering the evidence and the equities of the respective
parties, the trial court had not abused its discretion in declining to set
aside the forfeiture provision. 07
The rejection of the unjust enrichment defense in Albuquerque Ranch
Estates is typical of cases involving forfeiture provisions in real estate
contracts. The court's willingness to enforce forfeiture provisions strictly
reflects a policy choice favoring freedom of contract over a fair and
equitable result in real estate cases.1 °8 Parties entering into real estate
contracts, therefore, should be aware of the likelihood that the vendor's
right of forfeiture will be strictly enforced in the event of any default in
payments under a real estate contract in New Mexico.
C. Ramifications of Albuquerque Ranch Estates
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court's decision that the contractual
notice requirement would not be enforced following assignment of the
contract increases the risks associated with real estate transactions, both
for purchasers of real estate and for attorneys practicing in the real estate
area. Non-enforcement of the notice provision, coupled with strict enforcement of the forfeiture provision, significantly increases the risk that
purchasers will suffer forfeiture without an opportunity to cure the default.
105. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558. The original price under the contract between Ranch
Estates and Tract C was $224,398.50. Record at 22. KAC and Tract C presented evidence that the
fair market value of the property was $980,000 at the time of trial. Id. at 133.
106. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558.
107. Id. at 106, 654 P.2d at 559.
108. Unlike New Mexico, many jurisdictions have recognized the inequitable result of strict
judicial enforcement of forfeiture provisions, particularly when the purchaser has made a substantial
investment at the time of forfeiture. G. E. Osborne, supra note 1, § 3.26. These jurisdictions have
adopted various judicial and statutory limitations to mitigate this harshness, including: (1) statutory
notification requirements and grace periods for payments, id. at § 3.27; (2) recognition of an equitable
right of redemption such as exists with mortgages, id. at § 3.28, at 87 (New Mexico has rejected
giving purchasers an equitable right of redemption with real estate contracts, see supra note 90);
(3) requiring foreclosure as a mortgage; and (4) restitution to the purchaser of payments made prior
to forfeiture, G. E. Osborne, supra note I, § 3.28, at 90, 95.
A more equitable result might have been achieved in Albuquerque Ranch Estates by affording
Tract C an equitable right of redemption. See, e.g., Springer Corp. v. Kirkeby-Natus, 80 N.M. 206,
453 P.2d 376 (1969). In Springer, a case involving multiple mortgages, the court held that one
mortgagee's rights, including the right of redemption, were not impaired by foreclosure of another
mortgage on the same property. 80 N.M. at 210, 453 P.2d at 381. The court also could have required
restitution of all payments made under the original contract between Ranch Estates and Tract C.
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Non-enforcement of the notice requirement also increases the risk to
attorneys of committing malpractice.
1. Risks to the Real Estate Purchaser
In multiple contract situations, the Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision
can affect an original purchaser's rights against both the vendor and the
assignee. First, the decision permits the vendor to recover the property
and to retain any payments made by the original purchaser under the first
contract without affording the original purchaser notice of an assignee's
default or an opportunity to cure such default." Second, the decision
allows the original purchaser's right of recovery against the assignee
under the second contract to be extinguished without the original purchaser's knowledge." 0
The written notice requirement is a primary means of protecting the
purchaser's rights in pyramid purchase situations. '' The notice provision
is designed to provide the original purchaser with both knowledge of the
assignee's default and an opportunity to cure that default." 2 Without
notice, the original purchaser may be unaware that the assignee is in
default or may be uncertain of the date or the amount of the default." 3
As a result, the vendor may act to forfeit both the property and any
previous payments before the original purchaser becomes aware of the
default or has an opportunity to cure the default to prevent forfeiture. "'
By adopting the minority position on the effect of assignments," 5 the
court has increased the likelihood that purchasers in New Mexico will
have their rights under the original contract forfeited without ever being
afforded the opportunity to prevent forfeiture.
The court's ruling that the purchaser is not entitled to notice of the
assignee's default also ignores any right of recovery the purchaser might
have under a second contract with the assignee." 6 Without notice of
default, the purchaser may be unaware of the accrual of its right to recover
109. See infra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
111. New Mexico law has required that notice be clear and sufficiently articulated so as to place
the purchaser on notice of an unmistakeable intent to claim a forfeiture. Martinez v. Martinez, 101
N.M. 88, 91-92, 678 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (1984); Albuquerque Ranch Estates, 99 N.M. at 103,
654 P.2d at 556.
112. Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); A. L. Corbin, supra note 56,
at § 867.
113. In Albuquerque Ranch Estates, Tract C had knowledge that Ranch Estates had sent notice
of default to KAC. Ranch Estates refused, however, to advise Tract C of the date on which the
notice had been sent. Record at 358-59. Consequently, Tract C was unable to determine when the
90-day cure period, see supra note 15, began to run.
114. Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 92-93, 678 P.2d 1163, 1167-68 (1984).
115. 99 N.M. at 105, 654 P.2d at 558. See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
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the property under the second contract." 7 The purchaser will thus be
precluded from acting to exercise that right prior to revesting of the
property in the vendor." 8 Following the Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision, New Mexico law clearly permits the original purchaser's right of
recovery against an assignee to be extinguished without notice of the
assignee's default under the original contract. "9
A purchaser's lack of knowledge of the necessity to cure the default,
coupled with the judicial willingness to enforce forfeiture provisions strictly,
will render forfeiture an almost inevitable result of any default by an
assignee. l'This risk to purchasers ultimately will diminish the usefulness
of real estate contracts as devices for financing the purchase of real estate
in New Mexico.' 2'
2. Risks to the Real Estate Attorney
The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court's decision not to enforce the
contractual notice provision also increases the likelihood that attorneys
in New Mexico will fail to protect adequately the interests of their clients
when advising those clients concerning pyramid purchases of real estate.
117. See supra note 113.
118. See supra note 113. The court's decision in Albuquerque Ranch Estates that forfeiture was
proper seems to rest on the finding that Tract C had sent KAC notice of default under the second
real estate contract after learning of Ranch Estates' demand for payment. 99 N.M. at 99-100, 654
P.2d at 552-53. Tract C's right of forfeiture under the second contract thus accrued approximately
one month prior to the end of the 90-day cure period under the original contract. Tract C, after
receiving KAC's payment under the second contract, did not act to declare that the property was
forfeited at the end of the 30-day period provided for in its contract with KAC. Id. at 105, 654 P.2d
at 558. At trial, Tract C provided testimony that it had been advised by KAC that an extension of
time to make the payment to Ranch Estates had been granted by Ranch Estates and that KAC was
no longer in default. Record at 358.
119. The Albuquerque Ranch Estates court's ruling which permits the extinguishment of the
purchaser's rights under the original and second contracts without notice of default also raises
constitutional concerns regarding deprivation of rights without due process. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 18. A comprehensive treatment of those issues is beyond the scope
of this Note.
120. See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
121. The usefulness of real estate contracts as devices to allow purchases of property with very
small down payments has been recognized by the court. See Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355
P.2d 277 (1960):
Admittedly, there may be some disadvantages to this type of contract, but
it is felt that the advantages far outweigh them when the benefits, which are
derived by thousands of people who have been enabled to purchase property
by merely paying for it over many years in a manner likened to rent, are
considered.
Id. at 342, 355 P.2d at 279. The risk of forfeiture without a right of redemption, such as exists with
mortgages, is considered to be the trade-off for the benefit of buying property with small installments.
Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 92, 678 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1984). When the likelihood of
forfeiture is increased, the risk of losing both the property and any money already invested in the
property begins to outweigh the benefits of real estate contracts; the use of the contracts may then
decline. Id.
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Attorneys will suffer an increased risk of committing malpractice, either
by continued reliance on written notice to protect the client's rights or
by failure to provide for an alternate means of protection when structuring
real estate transactions. Attorneys who represent purchasers and who are
unaware of the court's unwillingness to enforce the notice requirement
may continue to follow the traditional (and now inadequate) practice of
incorporating provisions for notice of default to protect their client's
rights.' 22 These attorneys are likely to find themselves defending malpractice suits brought by clients who have had their rights forfeited without
notice in accordance with theAlbuquerque Ranch Estates ruling.' 23
There appear to be few alternatives to notice that attorneys can employ
to protect a purchaser's rights in multiple contract situations.' 24 The Albuquerque Ranch Estates decision, by effectively eliminating notice as
a reliable means of protecting their clients, renders it necessary for attorneys to develop new devices. The inconsistent positions of the court
in choosing to enforce contractual forfeiture provisions while declining
to uphold contractual notice requirements, however, renders the effectiveness of any new device unpredictable. Even without relying on notice
provisions, attorneys may still find that they have failed to protect adequately their client's rights in multiple contract transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In order for real estate contracts to continue to provide a means of
financing real estate purchases in New Mexico, some action by the supreme court or the legislature will be necessary to diminish the risks to
purchasers and attorneys resulting from Albuquerque Ranch Estates.2 '
In the absence of legislative or judicial action, continued enforcement of
forfeiture without notice will allow vendors to extinguish purchasers'
122. Notice provisions are routinely included in standard forms of real estate contracts such as
the Valiant #103 involved in the Albuquerque Ranch Estates case. See supra note 13.
123. See supra note 12. This does not mean that provisions requiring notice of default should
not be included in real estate contracts following Albuquerque Ranch Estates. Where the parties in
multiple contract situations are willing to abide by the terms of the contract, notice of default may
still be an effective means of protecting the purchaser's rights. Because of the unpredictability of
judicial enforcement, however, attorneys should not rely on the parties to provide notice of default.
124. One possible means is the use of a device similar to a wrap around mortgage, where payment
would be made to an escrow agent by the assignee, and the escrow agent would then disburse the
payment to the vendor and the purchaser.
125. Strict judicial enforcement of all provisions in real estate contracts, including the notice
provisions, would seem to be the most appropriate means of assuring that the expectations of the
parties to real estate contracts will be given effect.
As a possible alternative to strict enforcement by the courts, the legislature could enact legislation
mandating notice of default, restitution, or an equitable right of redemption, such as exists with
mortgage transactions. See supra note 108. See also Bishop v. Beecher, 67 N.M. 339, 355 P.2d
277 (1960).
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rights without allowing those purchasers an opportunity to act to protect
their interests. 26 The inconsistent judicial treatment of different contractual provisions will render it difficult for attorneys to devise alternative
methods for preventing such unilateral forfeitures.' 27 Until the decision
is clarified or overruled, however, attorneys should be aware of the pitfalls
created by Albuquerque Ranch Estates and advise their clients of the
significant risk of forfeiture in multiple contract situations.
EMILY A. FRANKE

126. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.

